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Introduction
SUBSIOIARY DEVELOPMENTS
hen the intmJep<ndrncc i. only ~p!""",n~ each pmon i.lin,jly linked with hi.
p",dec<,,,,,,,. rhan,.,m.linkcd with phanc..m.. It i. ltr,nge to tak< cverything
50 ",riOll,ly. Ancient philosophy;' , "r::mge Idbyr;,,,h;.m ab,.,.rat;on of"'>son. The
proper note to "rike: is ,hat of d",.m••nd [,iry ,.lcs.
-hiedrich Nietzsche'
The foreword 10 Ihis study on Georges Bataille evokes a figur~­
a phantasm, a scientific m)"th-whos~ anal)"sis has become possible only
now that this slud)" has been completed. Like th~ eyes of Jan"s. Ihe god
of for~words, these subsidiary developm~nts ,imultaneousl)" glance in the
direnion of what is 10 come and look back from Ihe results to the inten-
tion that occasioned the following argum~nts, in ord~r to ascertain that
this figure, which was a subjenive wurce of inspiration, did nol receive
a thematic treatment. The upcoming argllm~nts. therefore, simate them-
'eke' betw~en these Iwo perspectives, in the narrow gap that divides the
two masks of the dOllble-faced god, on the arch of the gateway where it i,
wrinen: Augmb!ick. moment, or blink of an eye.
The figure that We have just alluded 10 i, that of the pineal bod)",
the inconspicuous otgan that accotding to DeKarte, bind. body and w"l
together. Even thollgh according to Plato lallghing doe' nol comtitllte
an argllment worthy of philowph)", ever since Descartes's Treiltise oj,H,w
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2 Introduction
the pineal body has been an object of ridicule-of irony and sophistic or
cynical laughter. So if initially we wanted to devote our attention to this
figure, it was not in the least our intention to banter about in full agree-
ment with philosophy, nor was it to obey the Platonic protest against
laughter, since the laughter of philosophy and the earnesrness of its argu-
mentation are complementary. In fact, this laughter, for which Socrates
reproaches Polus, merely intends to refute an argument "that nobody
would accept:"
\'Ii?e cannot, however, deny that it was a certain scurrility of this figure
that first prompted us to pay attention to it. Scurrility in the sense that, like
a foreign body, the pineal body disturbs the body and the corpus of philoso-
phyand repeatedly provokes it to cheerfulness: but this is a cheerfulness and
a laughter that merely lead to the expulsion and rejection of the pineal body.
Based on the treatment that this figure had received in Georges Bataille's
texts, it appeared to us to be appropriate to demonstrate a movement on
the body of philosophy, which makes the expulsion of the pineal body into
a precondition of the constitution of its body. Or, to put it differently, to
generate in its corpus a laughter alien to philosophy (Niensche's or Batai!le's
laughter), which should have unsettled it until its shattering.
But the occasion for the present work-the fascinating incongruity
between the pineal body and the body ofphilosophy-and the prospect of
a different way of addressing this difference are nevertheless not symmet-
rical. Something like a nonlogical difference has produced itself in the act
of writing in the space between the occasion and the prospect. The the-
matic treatment of the pineal body based essentially on Plato's Timaeu"
Descartess Trt'iZfise ofMan, and Ihtaille's DOHier oft/,e Pineal Eye would
have attempted a deconstruction of the concept of truth, its inscription
in the context of castration and blinding beyond its control. But, direct-
ing our attention ro the myth andlor phantasm (rhe terms Bataille uses
to describe the obsessive insistence of the pineal eye) of which the pineal
body is merely one possible figure, the present work, while traversing
Hegel's Phenomenology, aims at the development of a phantasmatology
that passes through the different stages of the becoming of the Spirit in
an order contrary to that of the Encyclopedia. It appeared then that the
particular phantasm of the pineal eye, as it is staged by BatailJe, would
require a tra"ersing of the Hegelian philosophy of nature, a confrontation
buroduction 3
with this weak link in the dialectical chain. that is, of nature as the fully
exteriorized idea, which produces things contrary to its own norm and
makes it quite difficult to hang on to its concept or idea.
The reason why we abandoned the initial project of submitting the
pineal body to any of these two possible demonstrations is the already
mentioned displacement in the act of writing produced by the examina-
tion of the terms organizing Bataille's text: phantasm. myth, image, sign,
and so forth. As can be expected, the phantasmatology developed here
will set up the rules with which we can account for a specific phantasm
like the pineal body. At the same time, however, it is also clear that the
possible application of these rules to the pineal body would lead only to
a reduplication of phantasmatology. Rathet than be an illusttation or a
distinguished example on which this rule can be verified or falsified, such
an analysis would produce only another figure of phantasmatology.
Since the phantasm or scientific myth of the pineal eye does not con-
stitute a symptom of Batail Ie's text that could be dissolved by a phantasma-
tology, we could not assign to it the status ofan example or an illustration.
This is why phantasmatology differs from the Freudian interpretation of
dreams, since it is not a method or a theory but a textual formation that
cannot be separated from the materiality of the text in relation to which
it is being developed. With regard to the combination of the elements of
the dream that elucidate the dream "so exhaustively:' Freud wrote: "We
might also point out in our defence that our procedure in interpreting
dreams is identical with the procedure by which we resolve hysterical
symptoms: and there the correctness of our method is warranted by the
coincident emergence and disappearance of the symptoms. or, to use a
simile. the assertions made in the text are borne out by the accompanying
illustrations."'
Phantasmatology cannot exhaustively explain or be verified by privi-
leged examples. Thus. the point of departure-even the example of the
pineal body-has belatedly suspended itself until its very cancellation as
the occasion for the present work. If we now choose not to pursue the
possibility of a different treatment of the topic than the one provided by
philosophy, and that opened up toward the end of the work, the reason
is that the repetition of the Hegelian philosophy of nature in the context
of this work, would, as we have already suggested, have only provided an
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additional figure of phantasmatology. To be sure, the repetition is one
of the "rules" that characterize phantasmatology, and the sraging of the
actual phantasm of the pineal eye would not have denied us the kind of
bonus pleasure that we had promised ourselves at the outset. But who cares
about a bonus, a mere additional pleasure, if one can carry Ollt (without
having to add to the debate with three consecutive spheres of the Hegelian
system another one) a deconstruction of phantasmatology itself through
which its theoretical construction itself appears as the foremost example
of phantasmatology? \X!ith the deconstruction of the resulting theoretiza-
tion of phantasmatology alone and its subjection to the law of repetition, a
pleasure tightly bound to the death drive emerges whose perpetual repeti-
tion is the goal of even a text like Beyond the PIl'IlfUr" Pri"cipl".'
There is, however, an additional point that cannot be ignored, which
originally lay at the foundation of this work and regularly programmed
it, yet it was stiB not followed. This time, we are not talking about a the-
matic aspect but the systematic and methodological form of our reading.'
The initial plan consisted of using the Dossier d" I""il pintal (published
in the second volume of the Ol'U~r", complNes) as a reference text, and of
relying on the early works (the first two volumes of the collected works
and the period between 19Z2 and 19-/0) to help in its interpretation. As a
first atlempt, we have undertaken an analysis of all five versions of ~The
Pineal Eye" relying on linguislic and textual methods.' A syntagmatic and
paradigmatic analysis of the texts uncovered the chains of melonymies
and metaphors that structured them. In addition, we then identified ana-
grams, homophonies, ~cortect:' and punning etymologies as well as essen-
tial deviations from the canonical grammar and syntax of the French lan-
guage. It became clear that the structure of the production of these texts
obeyed the general economy of a perpetual erosion of linguistic materials.
Thus, a recourse to the dictionary turned out to be unavoidable, ~which
composes in its own way a text involved in that ofBataille';' to the extent
that, in his own words, ~the dictionary is execufl'd by the text the way one
is executed by firearms."?
This preparatory work was essential not because the five versions
of the Dmsia were literary texts, but because they can be located at the
point of intersection at which the usually dearly separated domains of
philosophy and literature overlap, cut across each other, and mutually cUI
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into each other.' Situated at the borderline of what is delimited through a
definition, in the domain of the transgression of a ban on touching, this
wavering stalUs opens up the following possibilities: (I) a problematiza-
don of the language of philosophy, of its repression of any consideration
of the materiality of its writing, which constantly threatens to distort its
transparency for meaning; (2) the problematization of literature in its
dependence on philosophy, as for the mosl part literature allows the latter
to prescribe to it its domain. themes. ideology, and its mode ofwriting; (3)
a mode of writing, an announcement of the materiality of language that
accomplishes the transgression of philosophy and lilerature in this space
between.
By concentrating on one text, on the diffetent versions of "The Pineal
Eye" that remained unpublished and unfinished by Bataille. we also hoped
to avoid the danger of presenting a complete and exhaustive system in
our explication of the "syslems and figures of Bataille's phil05ophy.~ The
system of inscriptions and productions of the Bataillean philosophemes
was to have remained tied to the "singularity" of the five versions as an
effect of only the things that are at play in these few texts themselves. Not
only would it thus have been possible to replace the syslem constructed in
this manner through the privileging of another texI and. consequently, ro
exchange it for another web ofconcepts, but it would have been possible to
thrust it into the process of the general exchange and waste that organizes
Bataille's way of writing. To the degree that the economy of expenditure
cannot be totalized, it is also impossible to unite all possible readings into
a single interpretation that would function as the "true" expression of
Bataille's "thought."
The reading that we planned to perform here was to produce some-
thing like the illusion of a system. This way we hoped to be able to avoid
writing about Bataille. Thesis-driven academic writing presents a discourse
on an author in which "the work's becoming a work is a way in which
truth becomes and happens.~ and which, as Heidegger wriles, strives for
the open, installs ilself in it, "setting and taking possession." and accord-
ing to the Greek meaning of thesi,• .sets ilself up in the unconcealed.1
In fact, it is possible to discuss that which preserves and conceals itself
in the openness of the unconcealed as truth. Yet Bataille's text itself makes
such an operation impossible-provided that we observe the movements
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of its mode of writing. The necessary precaution to write about Bataitle
could be attributed to the fact that Bataille himself had explicitly posed
the question of the ab(Jut. lO Bataille's simultaneous critical debate with
discourses that want to write or talk about something and his strategic
employment of these very discourses in the texts that we will analyze here
inscribe as a sequel every discourse that attempts to write about Bataitle
in his own text, whose movements undermine every stable point of view.
\,<rriting about Bataille, something we do not fully get around to, we must
imagine our position in him as a stand based in quicksand from which we
could pull ourselves out only by our own hair.
However, the purpose of this meticulous analysis of the textual
movements of the DOHierwas not to dissect and describe the text from
the outside with the reliable instruments of tried and tested methods
in order to escape its entanglements. To the contrary, the textlJal and
linguistic methods helped us to work out dearly the operations and
movements of BatailJe's mode of writing in such a way that we (who
must write about Bataille> could subject our conceptualizations to the
same laws that govern his texts. Therefore, it should no longer come
as a surprise if the traversal of pIJmomen(J!ogy is supposed to lead to a
pIJarlfl1>milf(J!ogy. Up to this point. we have merely tried to show how our
work here deviates from its original plan, but it remains that it would
not exist without its first subjective motivation and the already men-
tioned technical discussion of the DO/fia. Let us feturn to the praxis of
our reading. In order to be able to allow the text of "The Pineal Eye'" to
unfold itself in its complete and complex materiality. we read it in mch
a way that we did not fix our attention either on this Of that theme or on
this or that signifier. Reading with "evenly-suspended attention,"" our
objective was, as Lucette Finas has demonstrated in her amazing work
on rlladilme Edwarda, "to resend the story to itself, if possible. excluding
all external references with the exception of making it traverse my own
self; to detach and then reattach its retina. Nothing bur its retina-the
web of il5 noises.'"" Such a procedure is led by an economy of illlerpre-
tation that renounces every profit (every extraction of meaning) that
would come in the form of a surplus value from an investment of labor.
To be more precise, it avoids every attempt at the constitution of a fixed
meaning.
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The question. then, concerns not only what makes such a reading
of BataiUe's text possible but precisely what makes it necessary, First of
all. this reading unavoidably calls for a certain set of themes staged by
Bataille: above all, the theme of an economy of expenditure of riches as
well as of meaning, But this theme does not yet constitute a sufficient
ground for a reading of this nature, since a thematic interpretation implies
that the reader can break down the text into its complexes of meaning
and sense, which could then be grasped in a profit-oriented interpreta-
tion as the sense. the statement, or the meaning of the text. From such a
perspective, the reading of the text would appear to be merely the in-itself
meaningless investment of labor, which is nevertheless necessary to ren-
der the text's intention and meaning transparent so that the btter can be
brought out and conserved as the original idea, This process presupposes
a form of blindness in relation to the text in its materiality and move-
ments, the blindness of the philosopher. for example, As Derrida has it,
"The philosopher is blind to Bataille's text because he is a philosopher
only through the desire to hold on to, to maintain his certainty of himself
and the security of the concept as security against this sliding, For him,
Bataille's text is full of traps: it is. in the initial sense of the word, a rca,,-
dal,"" This "sliding" that makes every conceptual and thematic reading
unsatisfactory and necessitates a textual reading cannot be demonstrated
on a theme like "expenditure" or the "gift." It can be demonstrated only
on the movements of the text itself, In other words, we must show that the
particubr theme is merely the surface effect of the expenditure practiced
by this mode of writing, The stake of reading, therefore, cannot be only
the explication of the way the text produces a concept, It also needs to
reveal the movement that releases the concept produced as the effect of
the play of signifiers and syntax to the movement of the text, which then
ruins it as a concept.
How ate we supposed to read the text then?
Usually. we read with what we could call an "inner sense." since in
the process of understanding we separate the essential from the inessen-
tial. the precious metal from the sbg, the signified from the signifier, This
inner sense is constituted in a similar way, in that the senses are deprived
of their materiality as bodily organs: the eyes. the ears. and the tongue are
sublimated in such a way that they make it feasible-in their henceforth
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possible cooperation and unison-to comprehend, grasp, and conceptual-
ize the pure intelligibility of the written. Undcr thc primacy ofsense, in thc
purity of the mutual penetration of logos and pfJOne to the degree of their
indistinguishability, the individual ..",.." (the eye, the ear, and tongue)
fuse into this inncr sense." Reading a text, however, means that we give
back to the individual senses their materiality so that the eye can abide by
the insistence of the leiters and the graphic organization of the written,
and the ear can abide by the sound produced by the tongue, and. as a
result. the "unison" of the organs fades away.LS Yet the differences between
the graphematic, the sounds and the tones. and the gestural articulations
and movements of the tongue correspond to the differences between the
three organs of sensation that cannot be Sl,blated." Reading Bataille or,
in a more general sense. reading a text means. therefore. to assume the
task of dismembering the body: "In order to recover in oneself that which
was miserably aborted at rhe beginning of the constitution of the human
body, one would have to break oneself into pieces and feel in one's body
the madness of a contonionist while, at the same time. one would have ro
become a drooling ferishist simultaneously of the eye, the behind. and the
foot."''' The fetishisric eruption of the individual organs from the homo-
geneous body or, what amounts to the same, their eroticization resrores ro
them once again their heterogeneous difference upon which the process
of sublation works irself oUi. Indeed, it is only through the annihilation
of difference-rhrough which the individual organs are reduced to func-
tions and ideal parts of a whole-that their harmonious interplay becomes
thinkable in the form of the ideality that we call a human being.
The dismembered organs open themselves to the equally diverse
material insrances that consritute a text. The already mentioned fetishiza-
rion and eroticization, however, are nor yet sufficient to prevent the real-
izarion of the unison. The individual organ is still an 0rg/won of the per-
ception of a sense, even if the latter is only a restricred sense: the ear hears
through sounds; the eye perceives essences through images and forms: the
tongue produces sense and meaning in the ideal element of a diaphanous
plJOnL Thus, another operation needs to be performed on the residual
idealiry of rhe sense organs so that they become capable of reading a text
without subjecring it to the violence of toralization that represses the text's
materiality and the strucrure of its nerworks.
